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THE LEGAL DEATH OF THE LATIN
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: BOLIVARIAN
POPULISM'S MODEL FOR CENTRALIZING
POW'ER, ELIMINATING POLITICAL
OPPOSITION, AND UNDERMINING THE
RULE OF LAW
Frank M. Walsh*
"The death of democracy is not likely to be an assassination from am-
bush. It will be a slow extinction from apathy, indifference, and
undernourishment. "
-Robert M. Hutchins, American educator and writer
ABSTRACT
Over the past decade, Hugo Chdivez has remade the Venezuelan polity
into one of his own liking: centralizing power and undermining his rivals.
The most striking feature of the changes in Venezuelan government is the
fact that the changes have been made through ostensibly legal mechanisms;-
that is, Chdvez has used Venezuelan democratic institutions to centralize
his power. Chdivez's blueprint for power-centralization is straightforward:
(1) he convened a constitutional constituent assembly to rewrite the previ-
ous constitution, (2) he created a doppelganger Congress and Supreme
Court, gradually transferring power from the existing Congress and Court
to the new institutions, and (3) he dissolved the original Congress and Su-
preme Court, leaving only his hand-picked versions of the legislature and
judiciary. Bolivia's President Evo Morales and Ecuador's President Raf-
ael Correa have already begun to copy Chdvez's approach. Democracy's
supporters must meet this rising authoritarian tide by supporting increased
rule of law reform in Latin America.
ARTICLE:O NFebruary 15, 2009, Venezuelans took to the poiis and ap-
proved a constitutional amendment removing presidential term
limits. Hugo Ch~ivez, the Venezuelan president, championed the
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referendum as the "perfect victory" and proclaimed his now unlimited
tenure as opening "wide the gates of the future."' The removal of term
limits, however, was just the latest in a string of changes to the Venezue-
lan government that have centralized power in ChAvez's hands. A dec-
ade ago, Venezuela was a functioning (albeit not perfect) democracy with
a separation of powers between coordinate branches of government. To-
day, Chdvez has replaced the judicial and legislative branches with his
own hand-picked lackeys, centralized power in the executive branch, and
cleared the way for a lifelong term of office.
The most striking feature of the changes in the Venezuelan polity is the
fact that the changes have been made through ostensibly legal mecha-
nisms; that is, Chdivez used Venezuelan democratic institutions to central-
ize power. Alongside official changes through legal channels, ChAvez and
his supporters have engaged in illegal tactics to silence opposition
through intimidation and coercion.2 The legal changes to government,
accompanied by illegal acts of coercion, have resulted in an empowered
Hugo Chdivez and a government that is fundamentally unable to check
ChAvez's agenda.
Policymnakers must confront this assault on the rule of law in Latin
America. The Venezuelan centralization of power represents a danger-
ous potential path for the countries in the region; Bolivia's President, Evo
Morales, and Ecuador's President, Rafael Correa have both already mir-
rored several of ChAvez's power centralization moves. Paraguay and Nic-
aragua might be next. These changes threaten to undo decades of
commitment and millions of dollars that have been spent trying to de-
velop Latin American democracies and instill the rule of law.
This article analyzes the Venezuelan power centralization in several
ways. Part I discusses Chdvez's institutional "reforms." By examining
the seminal Spanish-language documents relied upon by Ch~ivez, the arti-
cle explains exactly how Chdivez was able to navigate the legal channels
to fundamentally undermine the rule of law in Venezuela. Part 11 dis-
cusses how the Venezuelan-Bolivarian Revolution has been mirrored by
other nations. Part III argues that democracy's supporters should meet
the Bolivarian challenge with a renewed emphasis on rule of law reform
and a commitment to Latin American democracy.
1. Ian James, Meltdown Threatens Chdvez Triumph, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 16,
2009, available at http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=6890186; Car-
men Gentile, Voters Grant Extended Rule to Chdivez, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2009,
available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/feb/I6/Ch~vez-targets-
limits/.
2. See, e.g.. Chdvez's Groundwork for Lifetime in Office. WASH. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009
("Student-led opposition groups, whose evocative slogan is 'No Means No,' have
faced intimidation and violence. Members of the anti-ChAvez press have been
beaten and killed").
2010] LEGAL DEATH OF LATIN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 243
1. THE LEGAL DEATH OF THE VENEZUELAN DEMOCRACY
Hugo ChAvez was able to centralize power by first paralyzing other
branches of government and then replacing them. As described infra,
Ch~vez first created a doppelganger body (a new legislature and new
court) and then began to favor the new doppelganger over the original
entity. Over time, Chdvez abolished the original institution and trans-
ferred all power to his new creation. In that way, he was able to quietly
replace the coordinate branches of government.
This type of power centralization is not unprecedented: democracies
have become undemocratic before. Probably the most often cited exam-
ple is the Weimar Republic's collapse into fascism before World War II.
A powerful and charismatic public speaker, Adolf Hitler won election
based on the popularity of his criticisms of the Versailles settlement.3
Once in power, Hitler pushed through a number of centralization mea-
sures to consolidate his power. On March 24, 1933, the Reichstag passed
the Enabling Act, which gave the cabinet full legislative power and the
ability to deviate from the Weimar Constitution.4 On July 14, 1933, the
Reichstag passed a law prohibiting any political party other than the Nazi
Party.5 The Nazis also passed a number of laws and decrees that reduced
the powers of regional and local governments and abolished representa-
tive assemblies.6 The judiciary was likewise attacked; when the Supreme
Court acquitted three of the four defendants charged with complicity in a
fire set at the Reichstag, Hitler stripped the Supreme Court of jurisdic-
tion and established a new "People's Court" to try cases.7
Chdvez's Venezuela is not as centralized as Nazi Germany, nor are
Ch~vez's coercive measures as brutal as Hitler's. Their blueprints for
power centralization, however, are substantially similar. Both were mili-
tary veterans. Ch~ivez served as a Venezuelan paratrooper while Hitler
was a decorated war hero in World War 1. Both participated in failed
coups in their early political careers, Chdvez in a failed 1992 endeavor
and Hitler in the 1923 Beer Hall Putsch. Both were imprisoned for their
involvement in the coup attempt, and both spent their time in prison con-
templating their return to power through democratic election. Both came
to power on the heels of persistent political corruption and an inability to
address social problems such as income inequality. Both rode the wave
of popular support to power. And both were able to use their countries'
legal systems to create autocracy where democracy had formerly stood.
3. For a history of Adolf Hitler's rise to power, see Judicial Decisions: International
Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 41 Am. J. INT'L L. 172
(1947).
4. Id. at 178-79.
5. Id. at 179.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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A. CHAVEZ's RISE TO POWER AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
BoLIVARIAN REVOLUTION
Hugo Ch~ivez was profoundly affected 8 by what he perceived as the
government's inability to alleviate the plight of the country's poor and its
eagerness to send the military to quell protestors. 9 ChAvez held the gov-
ernment, and its constitution, in such contempt that he attempted a coup
in 1992.10 The government was able to resume control and Chdvez's coup
ultimately ended in failure. Despite the coup's failure, Chdvez emerged
politically successful from the ordeal. Chdvez's arrest provided him with
the opportunity to voice his complaints with the traditional establishment
and list a series of demands, such as "cost-of-living clauses for wages, tax
reform facilitating a redistribution of wealth, and renegotiation of
debt."' 1 These demands were extremely popular with Venezuelans, and
his actions were viewed as an attempt for change. Ironically, Chdvez's
failed overthrow of the democratically elected government acted as the
catalyst for his own democratic ambitions.
Hugo Chdvez refers to his political philosophy as the Bolivarian
Revolution. The movement repackages populism. Based on Hugo ChA-
vez's interpretations of Simon Bolivar, Simon Rodriguez, and other leftist
leaders, Bolivarianism advocates income and land redistribution, the mo-
bilization of the state's resources to increase the poor's standard of living
in the attempt to achieve "social justice," and asserting a nationalistic
stance to regain a supposed loss of sovereignty during and following the
Cold War.'12
Another crucial characteristic of the Bolivarian Revolution is its appar-
ent propensity to concentrate power.' 3 The founding members and their
ideology expressed a willingness to supersede legal constraints to achieve
8. See generally ALEIDA GUEVARA, CHAVEZ, VENEZUELA AND THE NEW LATIN
AMERICA (2005) (Che Guevara's daughter interviews Chavez on his views of the
Bolivarian revolution).
9. U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note: Venezuela (Feb. 2007). Venezuela's return
to democracy in the 1960s failed to bring about the economic and political equality
for which the people were starving. The weakening economy limited the extent to
which the government could allocate patronage, a major source of its legitimacy.
The party's subsequent loss of political capital made the apparent and pervasive
corruption less tolerable. Tensions reached its pinnacle on February 1989, when a
riot broke out in the streets of Caracas and hundreds of people were killed. This
incident, commonly referred to as "Caracazo," represented a much larger disillu-
sionment with the political leadership and the policies of the time. It had enor-
mous political ramifications that reverberated throughout the political, social, and
military circles. Id.
10. MICHAEL MCCAUGHAN, THE BATTrLE OF VENEZUELA 66 (2005).
11. Steve Ellner, The Radical Potential of Chavismo in Venezuela: The First Year and a
Half in Power, LATIN Am. PERSPECTIVES, Sept. 2001, at 6, available at http://
web. arch ive.org/web/20071009084953/www.ne ravt.com/l eft/co ntribu tors/
ellner8.htm.
12. See RICHARD Gorr, IN THE SHADOW OF THE LIBERATOR: HUGO CHAVEZ AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF VENEZUELA 175 (2000).
13. Kurt Weyland, The Rise and Decline of Fujimori's Neopopulist Leadership, in THE
FUJIMORi LEGACY: THE RISE OF ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM IN PERU 13-19
(Julio Carrion, ed., 2006).
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their objectives. This notion has gained popularity after forty years of
observed political ineptitude. Following the 1992 coup, Hugo Chdivez
emerged as a folk hero and the Bolivarian revolution expanded its popu-
larity, symptomatic of the endemic shift towards authoritarian maneu-
vers. Hugo Chdvez's insistence to wear his red beret during campaigns
may have foreshadowed the large role the military came to play in Chdi-
vez 's administration and its centralized organizational structure.
During the 1960s, several ex-guerrilla fighters joined Hugo Chdivez's
movement, bringing not only their leftist ideology but also a militaristic
perspective. For example, Kl~ber Ramirez criticized the historical struc-
ture of the Venezuelan state, citing its limited capacity. He called for a
stronger national executive, the elimination of state legislatures, and reor-
ganization of the municipal government, which he argued would form the
bedrock of a new democracy.'14 Another patron of the movement, Ar-
gentinean historian Norberto Ceresole, echoed an already growing senti-
ment that democracy in Latin America was beginning to fail.'15
Furthermore, his prescription for a decaying system involved replacing it
with a strongman government buttressed by the military. 16 Following
Ch~vez's electoral victory at the polls in 1998, Ceresole decided to travel
to Venezuela in order to promote a more "progressive" military govern-
ment.'17 In sum, Bolivarianism rationalizes a populist, and occasionally an
authoritarian, governance method.'18
Armed with widespread public support, Ch~ivez set out to remake the
Venezuelan government. As described infra, Chdvez first attacked the
legislative branch, then the judicial branch, and finally removed executive
term limits.
1. Step #1: Chcivez Undermines the Congress By Creating a National
Constituent Assembly
Hugo ChAvez's actions as President illustrate that he had no intention
of defending and upholding Venezuela's Constitution. Several times dur-
ing his campaign, ChAvez stated that the constitution was "moribund"
and lacked legitimacy.' 9 He sought to radically and systematically trans-
form Venezuela's political institutions .2 0 In order to achieve this objec-
tive, he needed to write a new constitution that would eliminate certain
14. DANIEL HELLINGER & STEVE ELLNER, VENEZUELAN POLl rics IN THE CHAVEZ
ERA: CLASS, POLARIZATION, AND CONFLICT RAMIREZ 88 (2003).
15. Ellmer, supra note 11, at 6.
16. Id. at 6. Noberto Ceresole supported importing a government model similar to
that of Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nassar.
17. Although Noberto Ceresole undoubtedly influenced Hugo Ch~ivez at an early
stage, Chdvez ultimately ended the friendship and forced Ceresole out of Vene-
zuela for political reasons.
18. Harold A. Trinkunas, Defining Venezuela's 'Bolivarian Revolution', 85 MIL. REV.
39, 40 (2005).
19. Larry Rohter, Venezuelans Give Chavez All the Powers He Wanted, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 1999, at All.
20. Myers, supra note 2a, at 276.
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obstacles and create new institutions that would ultimately be responsive
to him. The establishment of the National Constituent Assembly proved
the mechanism through which Ch~ivez would achieve these lofty
ambitions.2'
In April 1999, Ch~ivez announced a referendum for the establishment
of a National Constituent Assembly ("ANC") to craft a new constitution
for the country.22 The Venezuelan public responded favorably to ChAi-
vez's promise that radical change and a new constitution would help alle-
viate the rampant corruption and injustice that plagued Venezuela.
Eighty-five percent of the voters favored the referendum. 23 Moreover,
seventy-two percent of the voters accepted that the newly created institu-
tion define its own limitation, creating the opportunity for the new body
to assume powers for which the 1961 Constitution did not allow. 24 The
July 25, 1999 election for ANC delegates resulted in an overwhelming
victory for Hugo Ch~vez's leftist coalition, the Patriotic Axis (Polo Patri-
otico), which won 120 of 131 seats.2 5 With an ANC composed primarily
of those politically and ideologically aligned with him, Ch~ivez began to
solidify his centralization of power.26
In August, the ANC officially commenced operations. While Congress
and the ANC ostensibly operated with a "cohabitation" relationship, in
reality, Congress was under constant duress from the Assembly.27 Con-
gress's acceptance of such a disadvantageous position resulted from fear
that it would be disbanded altogether. Ch~ivez and his supporters made
their distrust towards Congress and many within the administration called
for its immediate abolition. 28 Eventually, cohabitation gave way to com-
plete domination by the Assembly. On August 25, 1999, the ANC
stripped Congress of its right to pass laws or even meet.2 9 The ANC had
completely replaced the preexisting legislative authority in Venezuela.
2. Step #2: Chdvez Targets the Judiciary
a. The Decision on the Judicial Reorganization Decree
The ANC almost immediately exceeded its mandate to draft a new
constitution and instead set out to "restructure the state" by displacing
21. Larry Rohter, Venezuelans Applaud Leader's Assault on System, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
5, 1999, at A13.
22. Myers, supra note 2a, at 259.
23. HARVEY F. KLINE & HOWARD JOHN WIARDA, LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND
DEVELOPMENT 259-60 (2000).
24. Id. at 259.
25. Larry Rohter, Venezuelan Leader Moves a Step Closer to Broad New Powers, N.Y.
TIMES, 13 August 13, 1999, at A5.
26. Larry Rohter, Venezuelans Give Chdivez All the Powers He Wanted, N.Y. TIMES,
December, 16, 1999, at All.
27. RICHARD Gonr, IN THE SHADOW OF THE LIBERATOR: HUGO CHAVEZ AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF VENEZUELA 157 (2000).
28. Ellmer. supra note 11, at 13. Unlike Ecuador. members of the MVR noted that
Colombia had successfully suspended Congress in recent history, emboldening
their resolve to import this model.
29. Rohter, supra note 26, at A8.
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the Supreme Court.30 The Venezuelan Judiciary came under direct as-
sault from the ANC when, in August 1999, the Assembly declared a "ju-
dicial emergency."13' The Judicial Emergency Decree appointed a seven-
person commission, staffed by a majority of ChAvez-supporters, to review
over 2,000 claims of corruption and incompetence among judges and con-
gressmen and gave them the power to fire those found to be corrupt. The
Judicial Emergency Commission had jurisdiction to investigate the Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court, the members of the Judicial Council, and
approximately 1,200 judges.32 The ANC's Decree threatened to eviscer-
ate any independence the Judiciary had from the Executive; any judge
could be removed from office if the four Chavista members of the Judi-
cial Emergency Commission so desired.
While judicial oversight was in no way part of the ANC's legal man-
date,33 the Venezuelan Supreme Court nevertheless upheld the appointed
commission's constitutionality in an eight-to-six decision.34 Ironically, the
majority opinion based its argument on the principles of the rule of law:
"The Supreme Court reaffirms its submission to the rule of law and its
willingness to collaborate with other branches of government. It there-
fore offers to contribute to the principal aims of the Judicial Emergency
Decree."135 The majority relinquished any authority to override the deci-
sions made by the ANC and "unofficially confirmed the supra-constitu-
tional right of the ANC."136 The decision was so controversial that the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Cecilia Sosa, resigned in protest over
the decision.
The Decision on the Judicial Reorganization Decree was widely be-
lieved to be a result of ChAvez's intimidation of the Court-many
thought that if the Court confronted the ANC then Ch~ivez would have
simply dissolved the Court. Supreme Court Chief Justice Sosa lamented
that the court had "committed suicide to avoid being murdered."137 Presi-
dent of the Chamber of Deputies, Henrique Capriles Radonsky, echoed
Sosa's sentiments and said that the Supreme Court had acted out of self-
preservation:
[T]his action by the [Supreme Court] was an action to preserve their
existence within the republic . . . that there was great incertitude in
these actions by the [Supreme Court] because in essence the ANC
30. Chdivez's Power Grab, THE ECONOMISTr, Aug. 28, 1999.
31. The Venezuelan Lesson, WASH. Pos-r, Sept. 8, 1999, at A22.
32. Juan Jesus Aznarez, La Presidenra del Supremo Venezolano Dimire y da por enter-
rado el Estado de Derecho, EL PAIS DIGITAL, Aug. 25 1999, at 1209.
33. Decision on the Decree of Judicial Reorganization, [Supreme Court in plenum]
(Venez.) (Sosa, J., dissenting) Aug. 23, 1999, available at www. tsj.gov.ve/in forma -
cion/acuerdos/acp-23081999.html [hereinafter Decision on the Judicial Reorgani-
zation Decree] (discussing the limited nature of the ANC's mandate and the
established Supreme Court precedent limiting the ANC's purview).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Brenda Brown-Perez, Judicial Suspensions and Due Process Under Venezuela s
New Democratic Model, 19 J. NAT'L A. ADMIN. L. JUDGES 127 (1999).
37. Chavez's Power Grab, supra note 30.
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could, for example, at any moment in time, institute the Death Pen-
alty, and there existed no judicial organism by which an action by the
ANC could be declared illegal or unconstitutional. 38
The decision to cooperate with the ANC did not save the Judiciary:
rather, the ANC took the Decision on the Judicial Reorganization Decree
as an invitation to institutionalize its hold over judges.
Less than four months after the Decision on the Judicial Reorganiza-
tion, Chdvez finally buried the Supreme Court. On December 22, 1999,
the ANC created the Supreme Tribunal of Justice to replace the old Su-
preme Court.39 The old Supreme Court Justices were all removed from
the Judiciary as a new crop of pro-ChAvez judges took the reins of Vene-
zuela's highest court.40 The Supreme Tribunal of Justice asserted jurisdic-
tion over its predecessor's docket. The era of an independent high court
in Venezuela had ended.
b. The Aftermath of the Decision on the Judicial Reorganization
Decree: A Dependent Judiciary and a Controlling
Executive
The judicial system that developed in Venezuela after the Decision on
the Judicial Reorganization Decree resulted in a judiciary that was sub-
stantially dependent on the caprices of the Executive.4' Chdivez and the
ANC were able to maintain control over the Judiciary by (1) denying
judges tenure, (2) "packing" the Supreme Tribunal of Justice to ensure
that a majority of the Justices remained pro-Chdvez, (3) limiting the man-
ner in which judges could be nominated, and (4) suspending judges per-
ceived to impair the Bolivarian Revolution.
First, the Chivez administration has kept the vast majority of judges
classified as provisional and therefore afforded a lower degree of protec-
tion.42 According to a 2003 Organization of American States (OAS) re-
port, only 183 of the 1,772 judges in Venezuela were tenured.43 By
denying judges tenure, the Emergency Judicial Commission can remove
judges without even affording them a trial. For example, Supreme Tribu-
nal of Justice President IvAn Rinc6n Urdaneta explained that the March
2004 removal of three Caracas judges did not warrant a hearing because
they were "temporary judges with short terms."144 The ultimate result of
this perpetual tenuous employment is that judges are subject to arbitrary
38. Brown-Perez, supra note 36, at 128.
39. Michael McCaughan, Venezuela Issues Urgent Appeal for Volunteers, IRISH TIMES,
Dec. 28, 1999.
40. Id.
41. See Lauren Castaldi, Judicial Independence Threatened in Venezuela: The Removal
of Venezuelan Judges and the Complications of Rule of Law Reform, 37 GEO. J.
INV~L L. 477, 494-499 (2006).
42. Castaldi, supra note 41, at 496.
43. Inter-American Comm'n on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human
Rights in Venezuela 118 (Dec. 29, 2003).
44. Castaldi, supra note 41, at 495.
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removal and are more susceptible to political pressures.45
Second, the Venezuelan government "packed" the Supreme Tribunal
of Justice in order to get a favorable majority. Even though Ch~ivez had
replaced the old Supreme Court with his Supreme Tribunal of Justice in
1999,46 the Tribunal had grown too independent for his liking by 2004 .47
In May 2004, the ANC passed the Organic Law of the Supreme Tribunal
of Justice (Ley Organica del Tribunal Supremo de Jusiticia) that severely
changed the composition of Venezuela's highest court .481 The new law
increased the number of judges from twenty to thirty-two, and the twelve
new judges would be selected via a majority vote in the Ch~ivez-con-
trolled ANC.
The decision to enlarge the Supreme Tribunal was ostensibly made to
increase the Tribunal's capacity to handle its large caseload, but many
skeptics claimed that the move was actually a carefully calculated political
maneuver. 49 The ANC's statement that judicial nominees must self -iden-
tify with the "process "-that is, nominees must adhere to the Bolivarian
revolution-strongly suggests that the Tribunal's enlargement was politi-
cal in nature. The Supreme Tribunal, now firmly in the hands of pro-
Ch~ivez judges, declared that it had the right to review any decisions of
any court. Consequently, any controversial issue revolving around the
constitutionality of an act will ultimately be heard by a group that has
made clear its allegiance to ChAvez.
Third, the Organic Law changed the way the judicial branch deals with
changes in the nomination process of judges. Article 8 of the Law calls
for a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly to receive confirma-
tion. But, the vote can occur up to four times, allowing time for political
jostling and pressure, if need be. If the nominee does not receive the
required amount of votes after four attempts, then a simple majority
within the National Assembly suffices. The eventual simple majority rule
seems to make the two-thirds requirement superfluous. Given that a ma-
jority of the National Assembly belongs to President Chdvez's political
coalition and wants to see his vision carried out, the ostensibly demo-
cratic process of selecting members of the Supreme Court offer's no real
check on Ch~vez's tyranny of the majority.
45. Id. For further discussion on the effects on the judiciary from arbitrary removal,
see Steven Zeidman, To Elect or Not to Elect: A Case Study of Judicial Selection in
New York City 1977-2000, 37 U. MICH. L. J. 818, 820 (2004).
46. See MICHAEL MCCAUGHAN, THE BATTLE OF VENEZUELA 66 (2005).
47. Some speculate that Chavez desired a change to the Tribunal in order to reverse an
earlier decision acquitting those responsible for a failed 2002 coup d'etat against
Chavez. The Supreme Tribunal had dismissed the charges against four military
officers who participated in the coup, citing that there was no real coup but rather
only a "power vacuum."
48. Rigging the Rule of Law: Judicial Independence Under Siege in Venezuela, 16:3
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/
venezuela0604/index.htm (last visited May 10, 2007).
49. In similar fashion, Franklin D. Roosevelt's threatened to "pack the court" in 1937
when the U.S. Congress struck down his New Deal legislation.
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Fourth, the Organic Law created the means for arbitrary suspensions of
judges, making them more likely to preserve the status quo and not upset
the National Assembly. The same problems that arose from the simple
majority rule in the nomination process re-emerge in two specific mecha-
nisms that effectively neutralize a judge. Although the law permits re-
moving a judge with a two-thirds majority, the National Assembly can
suspend a judge pending a hearing and reject appointments to the court
with only a simple majority. A judge can be suspended for up to ten days
before having a hearing if he or she violates his or her duties outlined by
Article 265 of the Constitution and Article 12 of the Tribunal of Supreme
Justice law. In practice, however, these "10 day suspensions" are not ob-
served and several suspensions have carried on for a prolonged period of
time, even indefinitely. The selectivity of respecting the ten days allotted
by the Constitution also points to a potential for political abuse.
3. Step #3: Chdvez Removes Term Limits and Secures Indefinite Rule
As described supra, Ch~vez completed his authoritarian maneuvers on
February 15, 2009 with the removal of presidential term limits.5 0 Article
230 of the previous Venezuelan Constitution had allowed a president to
be re-elected only once. 51 ChAvez had found this limitation too constrict-
ing, and began to work towards its removal.
Ch~ivez's first attack on Article 230 came in December 2007, when he
sponsored a constitutional amendment that would have eliminated term
limits as part of an omnibus set of sixty-nine public policies that would
have also instituted communal councils and collective property, effec-
tively nationalized banks, nationalized large ports of the agriculture and
oil industries, empowered authorities to detain citizens without charge,
and declared "the mandate to unify Latin America."152 While the Chd-
vez-supported legislature approved this massive reform,53 the majority of
Venezuelan voters rejected the referendum and the presidential term lim-
itation remained intact. Only fourteen months later, however, Ch~vez
once again pushed for indefinite rule. The voters responded this time,
and Chdivez now stands ready to run for another term in 2012.54
4. A Chtivez-centric Polity
ChAvez's attack on potential opponents did not stop with the judiciary
and legislature. His next target was the unofficial fourth branch of gov-
ernment, the media. The most prominent example of ChAvez's anti-me-
dia campaign was the government's refusal to renew the broadcast license
for Radio Caracas Television (RCTV), the most vocal opposition news
50. Ian James, Meltdown Threatens Chavez Triumph, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 16, 2009.
51. VENEZUELAN CONSTITUTION, Art. 230 (1999).
52. See Chavez's Groundwork for Lifetime in Office, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009; Juan
Forero, Chavez Wins Removal of Term Limits, WASH. POST, Feb. 16. 2009, at A10.
53. Venezuela Congress OKs Ending Chavez Term Limits, REUTERS ONLINE, Nov. 2,
2007.
54. Ian James, Meltdown Threatens Chavez Triumph, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 16, 2009.
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source.55 Even though RCTV was Venezuela's oldest television station,
ChAvez did not hesitate in replacing RCTV with state-run television sta-
tions, which showed cartoons and old movies during the protests accom-
panying RCTV's closure.56 Chdivez's repression of RCTV has been
repeated against other media outlets that choose to criticize the Venezue-
lan president. 57
The result of ChAvez's "reforms" has been a Venezuelan state that in-
sulates its executive from democratic challenge. As the Economist Intel-
ligence Unit states, "[tihe Venezuelan Constitution gives significant
political power to the executive. .. .[i]n practice, Mr. Chdvez retains even
more influence than stipulated under the Constitution."15 8 For example,
after Venezuelans rejected a series of ChAvez-supported reforms in De-
cember 2007, Chdivez secretly pushed twenty-six laws through the legisla-
ture that affected most of the measures rejected in the national
referendum. 59 Ch~ivez has systematically eviscerated the Venezuelan leg-
islature and judiciary's ability to control his power.60 As Fulbright
Scholar Brenda Brown Perez writes, as a result of Chdivez's constitutional
maneuvering, "Venezuela lost any semblance of 'balance of powers,' at




One of the most striking aspects of ChAvez's power centralization has
been the fact that it was done via legal channels; ChAvez used ostensibly
legal mechanisms to strip potential opponents of power. Simply put, de-
mocracy is not necessarily permanent. Seventy years ago, a German ex-
military officer won election and passed a series of laws that morphed a
democracy into an autocratic state.62 Today, a Venezuelan ex-military of-
ficer has done the same.
11. THE VENEZUELAN MODEL COULD BE FOLLOWED IN
OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
The real danger of the Venezuelan model for undermining the rule of
law via legal mechanisms is the fact that other countries have begun to
follow Venezuela's lead. ChAvez has not been a passive bystander in this
process; he has actively pursued the "exportation" of his Bolivarian revo-
55. Jens Gould, Is Caracas Stifling the Media?, TIME, May 29, 2007.
56. Id.
57. See Venezuela Begins Shutdown of 34 Radio Stations, REUTERZS ONLINE, Aug. 1,
2009 (Chavez refused to renew the broadcast licenses for 34 opposition television
stations).
58. Venezuela Risk: Political Stability Risk, THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, July
23, 2008.
59. Jaime Daremblum, Venezuela's Weak Strongman: Chavez does not speak for the
South American left, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Aug. 18, 2008.
60. See Brenda Brown Perez, Judicial Suspensions and Due Process Under Venezuela's
New Democratic Model, 19 J. NAT'L A. ADMIN. L. JUDGES 125 (1999).
61. See id. at 154.
62. See id.; Venezuela's Hugo Chavez's Arms Shopping Spree, FINANCIAL
TiMEs-GLO3AL NEWS WIRE, Aug. 9, 2008.
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lutions and has spent millions on Leftist candidates. By finessing consti-
tutions and pushing through legislation, other Chdvez-supported leaders
have tightened the executive's reins on control.
Bolivia's Evo Morales, in many ways Ch~vez's prot6gd, has begun to
follow the populist trend in centralizing power and nationalizing major
industries. 63 Since coming to power on December 18, 2005, Morales has
actively pursued a populist agenda. He has also followed Venezuela's ex-
ample by setting up a constituent assembly to change constitution provi-
sions that limit his power .64
First, Morales has attacked judicial independence. For example, after
several judges ruled against his expansive socialist programs, Morales
publicly criticized the judges and called for members of the Constitu-
tional Court to be tried by Congress.65 Morales's threats violated the ju-
dicial independence clause of the Bolivian Constitution, which reads: "the
magistrates and judges are independent in the administration of justice
and are subordinate only to the Constitution and the law."166
Second, when he found the Bolivian constitution too constrictive,
Morales undertook a massive series of constitutional reforms that were
approved on January 25, 2009.67 In standard populist fashion, Morales
removed the constitutional term limitation on presidents and added a
new Article 168 that will allow him to serve another term.68 The new
constitution includes a litany of other changes that give the government a
greater control over the economy, broaden the nationalization of private
industries, and increase the rights of indigenous people.69 The new con-
stitution also changes the judicial independence clause to read: "The fol-
lowing are guarantees of judicial independence: (1) judges will act in
conformity with the judicial profession, (2) the budgetary autonomy of
63. On his hundredth day in office, Morales nationalized Bolivia's oil and gas reserves,
ordering the military to occupy Bolivia's gas fields and giving foreign investors a
six-month deadline to comply with demands or leave. See Carin Zissis, Bolivia's
Nationalization of Oil and Gas, BACKOROUNDER, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS, May 12, 2006, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/10682/. Bolivia
also recently joined the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas, a socialist trade
group that previously consisted of Cuba and Venezuela. The new three-nation
pact is now calling itself the "Axis of Good," and is actively working to expand its
membership. Id.
64. Alvaro Vargas Llosa, Honduras's Coup is President Zelaya's Fault, WASH. POST,
July 1, 2009.
65. Bolivia: IBA Calls on President Morales to Desist from Undermining the Rule of
Law, INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, June 25, 2007, http://www.ibanet.org/
Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=5DDE8323-44A8-47D2-88D6-E1C45658633.
66. BOLIVIAN CONSTITUTION, Title 111, Art. 6 (2005) (Los Magistrados y Jueces son
independientes en la administraci6n de justicia y no estdn sometidos sino a la Con-
stituci6n y la ley. No podr~in ser destituidos de sus funciones, sino previa sentencia
ejecutoriada").
67. Terry Wade, Bolivia's Morales wins referendum, Eyes Re-Election, REUTERS, Jan.
26, 2009.
68. BOLIVIAN CONSTITUTION, Title 11, Art. 168 (2009).
69. Arthur Brice, Bolivarian vote on constitution could help president, CNN ONLINE,
Jan. 25, 2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/americas/0/23/bolivia.
referendum.
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the judicial organs."170 It is unclear whether this change from the
"subordinate only to the Constitution and the law" language is merely
cosmetic or whether there has been a substantive right in the judiciary's
ability to decide the law.
In short, Morales has strengthened the power of the Bolivian execu-
tive, undermined private property rights, and attacked the judiciary when
it resisted his progressive agenda. While the Bolivian polity is not as
Morales-centric as the Venezuelan government is Chdivez-centric, the
stage has been set for further power centralization. Given how Morales
has followed Chdvez's example thus far, it is not unlikely that Morales
would continue down the path towards autocracy.
Ecuador's Rafael Correa, Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega, and Paraguay's
Fernando Lugo are three other possible populist leaders who might fol-
low Chdivez's lead. While Ecuador,7' Nicaragua, and Paraguay have not
engaged in the wholesale centralization efforts that Venezuela and Bo-
livia have effected, leaders in Quito, Managua, and Asunci6n have been
receptive to populist rhetoric and policy. In sum, the rule of law in other
Latin American countries might fall prey to the same forces currently at
work in Venezuela.
11I. RULE OF LAW REFORM: DEFENDING AGAINST THE
ATTfACK ON DEMOCRATIC RULE
The Venezuelan example demands that democracy's supporters help
nations attempting to resist the slide into autocracy. The "shield" against
autocratic centralization should come in the form of rule of law reform,
where democratic institutions are developed and strengthened.
Rule of law, as a general proposition, states that governments should
respect the laws of a nation and recognize the decisions of the judiciary.72
Organizations like the World Bank, the Inter-American Development
Bank ("1DB"), and United States Agency for International Development
("USAID") have all emphasized the importance of engaging in rule of
law reform in Latin America. As USAID describes, rule of law reform in
Latin America advances American interests by promoting democracy:
By helping countries to establish just and effective legal systems, the
United States is able to strengthen democracies in the region, in-
crease their legitimacy in the eyes of citizens, and bolster support for
70. BOLIVIAN CONSTITUTION, Title 111, Art. 178 (2009) ("Constituyen garantfas de la
independencia judicial: (1) El desempefio de los jueces de acuerdo a la carrera
judicial (2) La autonomfa presupuestaria de los 6rganos judiciales").
71. Ecuador has already started down the Chavista path. Ecuadorian voters approved
President Rafael Correa's call for a constituent convention in April, 2007. See
Timeline: Ecuador, BBC NEWS, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/
1212826.stm. In November, 2007, the Constituent Assembly voted to dissolve the
Ecuadorian Congress on its first day of work. Id. On September 28, 2008, Cor-
rea's efforts towards a new constitution reached fruition: voters passed the new
document "by a wide margin." Joshua Partlow & Stephan Kuiffner, Voters in Ec-
uador Approve Constitution, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2008, at A14.
72. Castaldi, supra note 41, at 481.
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their democratic institutions. Judicial reform not only supports the
idea of democracy for which the U.S. stands, it actually aids the
mechanics of democracy, as well, ensures that justice functions effec-
tively and transparently.73
Strong judiciaries and an institutionalized belief in the importance of
the separation of powers are critical in ensuring democracy's longevity.
A detailed analysis of discrete rule of law reform lies outside the scope of
this article; rather, this article simply posits that a renewed emphasis on
rule of law reform is the appropriate response to Venezuela's attempt to
export its Bolivarian Revolution. Future rule of law reform efforts
should, however, build upon lessons learned from previous rule of law
reform efforts.
A. THE HISTORY OF RULE OF LAW REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA
Broadly speaking, rule of law reform institutionalizes the idea that the
law has a clear meaning, applies equally to everyone, and supports civil
liberties.74 Beyond that expansive definition, however, there is much de-
bate over what exactly is encompassed in the field. Thomas Carothers,
founder and director of the Democracy and Rule of Law Project, astutely
observes that the majority within the rule of law reform camp are lawyers
and thus places a larger emphasis on the judiciary and law enforcement
institutions more generally. 75 This has led to the interchangeability be-
tween the phrases "rule of law reform" and "judicial reform."176 The criti-
cal component of rule of law reform, whether it is in the judiciary or
elsewhere in the government, is an intent to reinforce the public's faith in
the law as an effective instrument of public policy.77
The history of rule of law promotion illustrates an evolution in the
movement's objectives and criteria as a better understanding of the prob-
lem developed. The movement in Latin America really started gaining
speed during the mid-1980s when bilateral and multilateral agencies be-
gan to progressively increase assistance targeting judicial reform.
USAID spearheaded the movement with a succession of legal framework
programs in Central America. The transition from the bilateral agencies
to the World Bank and the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) re-
ally took hold during the 1990s, signaling a change in the priorities of rule
73. See The Importance of the Rule of Law, USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/locations/
latin -america -caribbean/democracy/rule/index.htm; ef Glenn Kessler & Robin
Wright, Rice Describes Plans to Spread Democracy, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2005, at
Al (describing the Bush administration's argument that the spread of democracy
insulates countries against radical terrorism).
74. LUCE B. TREMBLAY, THE RULE OF LAW, JUSTICE, AND INTERPRETATION 154-56
(1997).
75. Carnegie Endowment, Democracy and the Rule of Law Project, http://
www.carnegieendowment.org/programs/global/?far~proj&id=101
76. THOMAS CAROTHERS, CRITICAL MISSION: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY PROMOTION
135 (2004).
77. See Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer, Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary, 38
AKRON L. REV. 555, 565 (2005).
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of law reform. By 1999, the World Bank and the IMF were responsible
for 30 rule of law reforms in the region, totaling $302 million. This piv-
otal moment signified the shift from a focus on criminal justice to limited
focus on commercial-related legal matters.
Rule of law promotion gained momentum after the Cold War primarily
because it was believed that such reform aids free market capitalism and
democratic liberalization. The fall of the Berlin Wall symbolized the tri-
umph of market capitalism and democracy. The collapse of the Soviet
Union and its puppet regimes left a vacuum, a gap that was filled by ideas
espoused by the West. As a result, the "third wave of democratization,"
as Samuel Huntington calls it, swept through Latin America and Africa
during the 1980s and 1990s. As newly elected governments came to
power all over the world, and especially in Latin America, they were
caught in the euphoria of the time and transitioned to market economies
in a rapid manner, often via orthodoxy policies. 78
The World Bank is illustrative of how international organizations have
undertaken rule of law reform .79 The World Bank first engaged in rule of
law reform because of its perceived connection to economic and demo-
cratic consolidation. The World Bank argued that rule of law reform pro-
motes the enforcement of contracts, property rights, and a solid
regulatory framework, which reinforces the free market and subsequently
increases development. As former World Bank executive director Mois~s
Nafm noted, the rule of reform is essential to the second phase of market
reforms, which entails building institutions such as tax agencies, customs
service, and antitrust agencies, and overall improving governance .8 0 Fur-
thermore, economic globalization and the introduction of international
investors are reinforcing the need for rule of law reform by demanding
that governments be more transparent and accountable to investors'
needs .8 1
78. ELIANA CARDOSO & ANN HELwEGE, LATIN AMERICA'S ECONOMY: DIVERSITY,
TRENDS, AND CONFLICTS 181-82 (MIT Press, 1992).
79. The World Bank was founded in 1944 with the mandate to support post-war recon-
struction and has since expanded to the broader mandate of reducing worldwide
poverty. It is the product of what is commonly known as the Western Liberal
Democratic International Order, which was committed to an open world economy
and the stabilization of socioeconomic welfare. THAZHA VARKEY PAUL & JOHN
A. HALL, INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND THE FUTURE OF WORLD POLITICS 126-30
(Cambridge, 1999). More specifically, the World Bank seeks to promote economic
growth by promoting low fiscal deficits, cutting subsidies as part of a larger push to
prioritize public expenditures, a broad tax base with moderate marginal rates, mar-
ket determined interest rates, an outward oriented economic policy, encouraging
foreign direct investment, deregulation, and privatization. John Williamson, What
Washington Means by Policy Reform, MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY AND LATIN
AMERICA: THEORY AND POLICY 18-23 ( Jeffrey Frieden, Manuel Pastor Jr. &
Michael Tomz eds., 2000)
80. PETER B. KENEN, MANAGING THE WORLD ECONOMY: FIFTY YEARS AFTER BRET-
TON WOODS 199 (1994).
81. ROBERT E. LITAN, FINANCIAL SECTOR GOVERNANCE: THE ROLES OF THE PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE SECTORS 212-14 (2002).
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Operating under this economic mindset, the World Bank's early rule of
law reforms concentrated primarily on commercial and other areas con-
sidered pertinent towards economic development. This narrow attention
became institutionalized when the World Bank's General Council stipu-
lated in 1990 that any of its reform initiatives must have a "direct and
obvious implication for economic development."18 2 As a result, the World
Bank dealt with lowering transaction costs associated with securing prop-
erty and contract rights by targeting judicial and related administrative
agencies. It did not address peripheral issues such as judicial indepen-
dence, access to justice, constitutional law, criminal law, or the protection
of human rights.
B. GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR EFFECTrIVE RULE OF LAW REFORM
The field of rule of law reform is a relatively new one that is still evolv-
ing as reformers attempt to isolate best practices and useful paradigms for
repetition.8 13 Nevertheless, several broad principles for effective rule of
law reform can be delineated.
First, the reform efforts must enforce judicial independence. The teeth
of rule of law reform stems from the institutions that are targeted by it.
Rule of law promoters tend to focus on the stewards of justice: the courts,
prosecutors, police, and judges. 84 Reforms attempt to increase the fair-
ness, competence, and efficiency in each of these institutions. 85 Although
not all academics agree upon which institutions need to be targeted, the
police, the judicial branch, and their subsidiaries are generally believed to
have the most direct effect on rule of law, and subsequently these institu-
tions have received the greatest amount of attention.86 While this em-
phasis on the judiciary may be a by-product of the overabundance of
lawyers in the field,87 some statistical evidence supports the contention
that judicial reform allows for the greatest gains in establishing the pub-
82. Memorandum of Vice President and General Counsel, World Bank, Issues of Gov-
ernance in the Governing Members: The Extent of Their Relevance uinder the
Bank's Articles of Agreement, at 38 (Dec. 21, 1990), quoted in Halfway to Reform.
The World Bank and the Venezuelan Judicial System, Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights and Programa Venezolano de Educacion, at 25, Aug. 1996, availa-
ble at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pubs/descriptions/halfway.htm.
83. See Shelby R. Quast, Lessons from the Past and the Challenges Ahead: Rule of
Law in Post-Conflict Societies: What is the Role of the International Community, 39
NEW ENG.L. REV. 45 (2004).
84. Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science Perspec-
tive on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 Am. J. Comp. L. 871, 891 (1997) ("The impor-
tance which people place upon the motives and character of the judge, police
officer, or mediator with whom they are dealing suggests one of the difficulties in
instituting a RULE OF LAW within a society. Although the RULE OF LAW suggests a
FOCUS uponl the neutrality of procedures, even within such procedures people are
strongly affected by their views about the particular authorities with whom they
are dealing.") (internal citations omitted).
85. MARK UJNGAR, ELUSIVE REFORM: DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN
AMERICA 141 (Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2002).
86. LINN A. HAMMEROREN, ENVISIONING REFORM: IMPROVING JUDICIAL PERFORM-
ANCE IN LATIN AMERICA 2 (2007).
87. CAROTHERS, supra note 76, at 135-138.
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lic's faith in the government. 88
The importance of judicial independence warrants special discussion.
As stated in a 1996 report by the Lawyers Committee: "Judicial indepen-
dence is the most important measure of commitment-the willingness of
the government to take concrete steps to reduce political influence in ju-
dicial appointments and court operations." 89 Judicial independence, vis-
A-vis the coordinate branches, is such an important indicator because in-
dependence is fundamental to the other tasks the judiciary carries out;
the courts cannot hold government officials accountable, resist political
pressures, or effectively administer justice if the courts are subject to the
whims of the Executive.
Second, rule of law reform must take place in a comprehensive way.
On a micro level, rule of law should focus on shortening the time to pro-
cess claims. transitioning to a more open adversarial approach with pro-
ceedings in open court, making a judge's decisions public, and explaining
citizens' legal rights to the public.901 On a more macro level, reformers
should establish the judiciary as an independent branch of government
vis-A-vis the other branches. This protection of the separation of powers,
a principle dating back to the Baron of Montesquieu, 91 reinforces the
public's faith in the law because only an independent judiciary can ensure
that government officials are not above the law.92
Effective rule of law reforms require both micro and macro level mea-
sures; faith in the law requires both micro steps that safeguard individual
rights and macro steps that protect the judiciary from executive encroach-
ment. Future rule of law efforts should build upon the lessons learned
from the World Bank's experience and address judicial independence, ac-
cess to justice, constitutional law, individual criminal law, and the protec-
tion of human rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
Democracy is not a static construct; rather, it can mature or regress
over time. The Venezuelan example illustrates how the current political
climate in Latin America can support a slide into autocracy undertaken in
the name of a populist revolution. The economic crisis that has gripped
the global economy since the end of 2008 will only exacerbate the funda-
mental conditions that gave rise to the autocratic slide.
88. Juan Enrique Vargas, Tools for the Design of Judicial Offices, Judicial Studies
Center, Santiago, Chile (2003).
89. Halfway to Reform, supra note 82.
90. SIMON A. ROB3ERTS & MICHAEL PALMER, DISPUTE PROCESSES: ADR AND THE
PRIMARY FORMS OF DECISION-MAKING 241(2005).
91. BARON DE MONrESOUIEu, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 181 (Thomas Nugent trans.,
H-atner Publ'g Co. 1949) (1748).
92. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 292-93 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed.
rev, with amends. 1970) (1690). For example, in Asia law is seen as a means to
facilitate the state in its activities. This is rule by law, not rule-of-law.
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Over the past two decades, Latin America has emerged from its check-
ered history of autocratic rule. Democracy has taken root, truth and rec-
onciliation commissions have been formed, and economic policies have
been opened. But the threat of autocracy still looms. Under the guise of
Ch~ivez-style populism, a slide away from the rule of law lingers as a wolf
in sheep's clothing. The international community must recognize the
threat of the Venezuela example and actively support the region's democ-
racies from following in Chvez's footsteps. Only then will Latin
America be able to ensure that the end of the twentieth century was the
beginning of a true democratic era and not just the region's democratic
moment.
